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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
whether the board is sitting in quasi-judicial or quasi-legis-
lative capacity. Rather, each case should be decided on
the basis of the facts that it presents with an eye to the
policy behind the doctrine of res judicata and the purpose
of the administrative action involved. Such seems to be
the approach of the Maryland cases in general and the
instant case in particular.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS-CONFLICT OF LAWS
Coastwise Petroleum Company v. Standard Oil
Company of N. J.'
Defendant inquired of plaintiff as to a prospective pur-
chase of a large quantity of benzol. Plaintiff replied by
letter, offering to sell the desired quantity to defendant on
named terms. Defendant, by telephone, said it was ac-
cepting the offer, but added other terms (thus it is ques-
tionable whether there was actually anything more than a
counter-offer, although the opinion appears to assume an
outright acceptance by defendant). Defendant then with-
drew, notifying plaintiff, again by telephone. All this
occurred in New York. Plaintiff sold the benzol at 14¢ per
gallon instead of the 20¢ provided for in the alleged con-
tract, and sued defendant in Maryland (in the Superior
Court of Baltimore City) for the difference, which ex-
ceeded $30,000. Defendant demurred to plaintiff's evidence
on the basis of the Statute of Frauds,2 and the demurrer
prayer was granted. Plaintiff appealed, contending that
estoppel is a recognized exception to the Statute of Frauds,
and that defendant was estopped to set up the Statute as a
defense here. Held: Affirmed.
The Court of Appeals went into a rather elaborate dis-
cussion of the Maryland authorities to show that in Mary-
land estoppel is not an exception to the operation of the
Statute. Then, seemingly as an afterthought, the Court,
in the last paragraph of the opinion, said: "The negotia-
tions were all in New York, and the law of that state
would apply. The Statute there is substantially the same
as it is in this state, and we have not been shown, nor do
119 A. (2d) 180 (Md., 1941).
29 Charles II, Ch. 3; 2 ALEXANDER, BRITisH STATUTES IN FORCE IN
MARYLAND (Coe's Ed. 1912) 789. Sec. 17 of the Statute was re-enacted in
effect by Sec. 22 of the Uniform Sales Act of 1910, Ch. 346, Sec. 273; Md.
Code (1939) Art. 83, Sec. 22. The language of the re-enactment is "shall
not be enforceable by action".
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we find any decisions of the Courts of the State of New
York applying or construing the Statute at variance with
the decisions of this Court."
If, as the last paragraph seems to indicate, the Statute
of Frauds of the place of contracting determines the valid-
ity vel non of the contract sued on in Maryland, then why
the discussion of the cases construing the Maryland Stat-
utes? This would appear to be wholly irrelevant to the
real question in issue, namely: What construction have
the New York Courts put upon the New York Statute of
Frauds? A possible explanation is that the Court of Ap-
peals used the Maryland decisions as indicia of the New
York law in the absence of proof of the latter. Presump-
tively, however, this explanation is incorrect, for it as-
sumes that the Court of Appeals violated its duty to make
an independent search of the applicable foreign law-a
duty imposed on it by the Maryland Judicial Notice Act.'
Then what is the explanation? Is the last paragraph
of the opinion dictum, and does the decision rest on the
Court's construction of the Maryland Statute? Or does
the major part of the opinion consist of dicta, so that the
actual decision is found only in the last paragraph? Or
did the Court actually search the New York authorities
on the question, find them in substantial agreement with
the Maryland authorities, and feel that a discussion of the
Maryland cases would be more valuable to the Maryland
Bar than would a discussion of the New York authorities?
Just what rule or policy of Conflict of Laws (if any) was
the Court following when it rendered this opinion? The
answers to these questions are anything but clear.
In other jurisdictions, several rules have developed
with respect to the Statute of Frauds in conflict of laws
cases. The majority of these rules rest on the same stated
policy of conflict of laws, namely that substantive matters
are to be determined by the law of the place of contract-
ing, while procedural matters are governed by the law of
the forum. The difficulties arise when the question of de-
fining substance and procedure is reached. 4 Another un-
derlying principle which sometimes appears is that even
as to matters of substance the lex loci will not be followed
3 Md. Code (1939) Art. 35, Secs. 56-62. This substantial adoption of the
Uniform Act commands (not suggests) judicial notice.
ICook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42
Yale L. J. 333; McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the
Conflict of Laws (1930) 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 933; Cheatham, Internal Law
Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws (1935) 21 Corn. L. Q. 570.
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if to do so would violate the public policy of the forum.
An exception to the former policy is the rule apparently
prevalent in continental Europe, where the forum will en-
force a contract which is valid and enforceable either by
the lex loci or by the lex fori (at least as regards the Stat-
ute of Frauds).'
In England, the leading case is Leroux v. Brown,' which
made the question of whether the Statute of Frauds is to
be deemed "substantive" or "procedural" depend upon the
particular wording used in the Statute. The 17th section
was worded "no contract shall be allowed to be good"
unless evidenced by a memorandum in writing signed by
the party to be bound, and it had been held to be substan-
tive. The contract in this case, however, was one involv-
ing employment, and could not be completed within a year,
and so came under the fourth section, which was worded
''no action shall be brought . . ." The Court deemed that
this wording made the section procedural, and so refused
to enforce the contract, although in France, where it was
made, it was clearly valid and enforceable.
In the United States some cases follow the mechanical
distinction laid down in Leroux v. Brown.7 The chief justi-
fication for this rule is that it is a rule, from which future
decisions may be predicted. The rule is criticized in that
the wording of a statute in this respect is probably acci-
dental; that a statute worded "no action shall be brought
"was really intended to have the same meaning and
purpose as one worded "no contract shall be allowed to be
good . . .". So, why say that the former is procedural
and the latter substantive? Also, this approach (as is any
approach based on purely internal law distinctions)" is
open to the further criticism that it may allow the enforce-
ment of a contract which violates the requirements of a
writing under both the lex loci and the lex fori.9
'Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws (1923) 32
Yale L. J. 311. Mention might be made also of some recent opinion to the
effect that both the statute of the place of contracting and that of the
forum should be satisfied. See Comment (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 320.
6 12 C. B. 801 (1852).
7 Kleeman v. Collins, 9 Bush 460 (Ky., 1872); Boone v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233,
154 S. W. 900, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 907 (1918); Third Nat. Bank of N. Y.
v. Steel, 129 Mich. 434, 88 N. W. 1050 (1902) ; Downer v. Chesebrough, 36
Conn. 39, 4 Am. Rep. 29 (1869).
8 See: Cheatham, Internal Law Distinctions in the Conftict of Laws
(1936) 21 Corn. L. Q. 570.
9 In RESTATEMENT, CONM-ZCT oF LAWS (1934) Sec. 334, the American Law
Institute takes the position that "the formalities required for making a
contract" are governed by the lex loci-i. e., are substantive. But in Coin-
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However, this latter type situation might be met by the
use of the public policy principle. This would be to deny
enforcement on the theory that the forum's statute ex-
pressed a public policy such as would preclude recognition
of a foreign contract which failed to meet the requirements
of the forum's statute, no matter how valid the contract
might be elsewhere.'0 Such argument harks back to the
title of the original English Statute of Frauds in 1676,
which included the words "Frauds and Perjuryes", resting
in the thought that the Statute is directed against perjury
and fraud, and cannot be set aside merely because a foreign
contract is involved." However, the authorities and
writers do not give much approval to placing the Statute
within the general public policy exception.12
Some cases have disregarded the mechanical distinction
of Leroux v. Brown, and still held the statute procedural.13
This result has been reached by saying that the Statute
merely relates to the evidence which may be used in prov-
ing the contract, and rules of evidence are procedural; or
by urging that the statute must be specially pleaded; or
ment b of this section, the Institute refrains from taking any position on
the question whether the requirements of statutes of frauds are part of
such essential formalities, and so substantive, or merely procedural. This
question is left to the individual states, which seems regrettable. Com-
ment b expressly sanctions even the absurd situation where the forum
enforces a contract which violates the statutes of frauds of both the lex
loci and the lex fori: "If the statute of frauds of the place of contracting
is procedural only and that of the forum goes to substance only, on oral
contract will be enforced though it does not conform to either statute".
This is playing with words with a vengeance! The setup received judicial
approval in Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb. N. C. 210 (N. Y., 1883), in which a
Missouri contract was sued on in New York, and the contract conformed
to the statute of frauds of ndither state; but the contract was enforced on
the theory that neither statute was violated because neither applied, the
Missouri statute being worded procedurally and the New York statute sub-
stantively.
The same complications may result from following any purely internal
law test of substance and procedure, such a need for pleading specially, or
whether or not a subsequent writing is sufficient to satisfy the statute,
which would entail the question of whether the writing is mere evidence
and thus procedural, or an essential part of the agreement itself, and so
substantive. See in this regard, Cheatham, Internal Law Distinctions in
the Conflict of Laws (1935) 21 Corn. L. Q. 570.
10 Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326, 39 N. E. 1026, 28 L. R. A. 57 (1895).
See also Barbour v. Campbell, 101 Kan. 616, 168 P. 879 (1917).
11 See Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326, 39 N. E. 1026, 28 L. R. A. 57(1895).
2 Lorenzen, supra, n. 5. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2nd Ed. 1938)
207, Sec. 85.
1i Heaton v. Eldridge & Higgins, 56 Ohio St. 87, 46 N. E. 638, 36 L. R. A.
817, 60 Am. St. Rep. 687 (1897) ; possibly Buhl v. Stephens, 84 F. 922 (D.
Ind., 1898) ; and Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co., 8 F.(2d) 601 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925). And see cases, GOODRICH, op. cit. supra,
n. 12.
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by looking to internal law distinctions between substance
and procedure.14
The preferable view, which at least a plurality of states
have adopted, is to hold the Statute, regardless of wording,
relates to substance in applying the conflict of laws rule. 5
This view seems to further the result normally sought for
contracts, namely that a contract enforceable where made
is enforceable everywhere. The Statute, to be sure, relates
to the evidence by which agreements may be proved. But
is it not fallacious to say that, ipso facto, the Statute is
procedural? By denying a party the right to prove a con-
tract by oral testimony it is in effect depriving him of his
remedy on the contract, which in turn is tantamount to
making the contract void-and this surely goes to substan-
tive rights. It is playing with words to say that a valid
contract cannot be enforced. A right without a remedy is
only a ghost-just as unreal and just as useless. A recent
Delaware case, after an excellent discussion showing
awareness of the possible views, chose this result. 6
The last paragraph of the instant case seems to be in
accord with this view as to a contract not enforceable
where made, but which is likewise not enforceable under
the Maryland statute. Apparently our Court of Appeals
has never been faced squarely with the question of what to
do with a contract enforceable where made but unenforce-
able if governed by the Maryland Statute. 7 However, in the
case of Fort Worth Packing Company v. Consumers' Meat
Company,' the Court dealt with a suit in Maryland on a
contract executed in Texas. The defense of the Maryland
Statute of Frauds 9 was sustained without any reference
14 Ibid; see also, Cheatham, supra, n. 8.
15 Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Holstein Harvey's Sons, 275 F. 622
(D. Del., 1921); Franklin Sugar Co. v. William D. Mullen Co., 7 F. (2d)
470 (D. Del., 1925) ; Lams v. Smith, 36 Del. 477, 178 A. 651, 105 A. L. R.
646 (1935) ; Miller v. Wilson, 146 Ill. 523, 34 N. E. 1111 (1893) ; Murdock
v. Calgary Colonization Co., 193 Ill. App. 295 (1915); Cochran v. Ward,
5 Ind. App. 89, 29 N. 1D. 795, 31 N. E. 581, 51 Am. St. Rep. 229. (1892) ;
Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., 137 Minn. 141, 162 N. W. 1082,
L. R. A. 1917E, 777 (1917); Matson v. Bauman. 139 Minn. 296, 166 N. W.
343 (1918) ; Anderson v. May, 10 Heisk. 84 (Tenn., 1872) ; Franklin Sugar
Co. v. Martin-Nelly Co., 94 W. Va. 504, 119 S. E. 473 (1923); GooDRicH,
Op. cit. supra, n. 12. But see Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the
Conflict of Laws (1923) 32 Yale L. J. 311.
11 Lams, et ux., v. Smith, 36 Del. 477, 178 A. 651, 105 A. L. R. 646 (1935).
See also to same effect, Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co., 311 Ill. App. 111,
35 N. E. (2nd) 522 (1941), noted in (1941) 3 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 103.
17 See RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (1934) MD. ANNOT., Sec. 334 and
adjacent sections.
1 86 Md. 635, 39 A. 746 (1897). And see the material cited in the pre-
ceding footnote.19 Sec. 17 of the British Statute as then applicable in Maryland.
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to Texas law. That was a tacit treatment of the Statute as
procedural for Conflict of Laws purposes, which is incon-
sistent with the last paragraph of the instant opinion. How-
ever, no reference was made in the instant opinion to the
earlier Maryland case or its discussion in the Maryland
Annotations to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws. If the
Court meant what it said in the last paragraph of the in-
stant opinion, then the Fort Worth Packing Company case,
with respect to the conflict of laws policy there tacitly
adopted, is hereby tacitly overruled. One could wish that
the Court would be less tacit about adopting and repudi-
ating such doctrines. In a field as intricate as Conflict of
Laws, it is certainly desirable that court opinions be as full
as possible as to the possible choice of rules and the rea-
sons for the one ultimately chosen.
